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SUMMARY
With the end of the cold war, virtually all of the institutions and assumptions associated with that era have come under scrutiny except the West European experiment in regional integration. Left unanswered, or even seriously discussed, when the Berlin Wall came down, were two questions raised by Alastair Buchan in 1974: "If West European union was a product of the cold war, will the one survive the demise of the other?" and "What role should the European Community play on a wider stage. . .?"
The nations of Western Europe chose to disregard these difficult questions because they had invested too much time and too many resources in European Community (EC) integration to risk derailing the whole experiment with an identity crisis. EC "completion" would provide its own answers over time. Furthermore, by 1990 it would have required considerable statesmanship to stop the EC train which had acquired an institutional life of its own (with over 19,000 EC employees).
There was, however, another reason why the nations of Western Europe continued to focus their attention and their energies on regional integration at the end of the cold war. It made it easier for them to defer consideration of unpleasant and controversial issues on the periphery of "little Europe." For the end of the cold war had created more problems than it had solved for the nations of Western Europe, and there was a natural enough inclination to wish them away.
The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated at an EC summit in the southern Dutch city of Maastricht during the period December 9-11, 1991, became the focal point of the post-cold war campaign of EC completion. The Maastricht Treaty has been widely heralded as the most important development in EC history since the Treaty of Rome, even though few European citizens outside of Brussels have even a vague sense of its contents. But if the specifics of the Maastricht Treaty are obscure, its purpose, as reflected in its priorities, is clear. Maastricht is first and foremost an economic document, designed to consolidate and expand upon the progress which had been made during the cold war toward the creation of a fully integrated West European economic system. This monograph argues that the post-cold war campaign for EC completion has diverted Western attention from two more important and immediate concerns: the eastward and southward extension of the West European "zone of peace" and the articulation and defense of common West European values and interests in the world community. Specifically, it will be argued that the Maastricht Treaty has actually made it harder for the nations of Western Europe to develop programs of economic and cultural reconciliation with the governments of Central Europe and the southern Mediterranean at a strategic moment in European history. This monograph will also argue that the "civilian" values which have become an integral part of the EC's identify have undermined vi the efforts of West European governments to play a positive role during the Persian Gulf conflict and the crisis in Yugoslavia. The report will close with some recommendations for developing a more cooperative relationship between Washington and the governments of Western Europe, as a basis for both pan-European and trans-Mediterranean security.
Introduction.
The present Community is but a fragment of Europe. If we fail to bring the democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe into our Community, we risk recreating division in Europe. . . 1 
John Major British Prime Minister
On November 1, 1993, citizens of the 12 nations of the European Community (EC) officially became citizens of the European Union (EU). This was the day when the much-battered and maligned Maastricht Treaty on European Union came into force. Initial plans had called for a high visibility media event to celebrate the occasion. But even the most ardent supporters of the Maastricht experiment understood that celebrations would have been ridiculous. Indeed, the best thing that the proponents of "European construction" could say about the final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was that it put an end to a long and enervating process which had diverted West European attention from other pressing issues.
Or did it? Representatives of the European Union are already hard at work laying the foundation for the 1996 Maastricht review conference, renegotiating the so-called "Schengen Agreements" for passport-free travel within the EU and pushing forward with plans for salvaging some form of European Monetary Union (EMU). The self-confidence and sense of identity of West European governments and publics have been shaken to their core by the events of the last three years, but the Eurocracy marches onward--toward what?
This monograph will consider some aspects of the Maastricht experiment from the point of view of their effects upon the current and future security of Europe. My arguments will be built around a simple thesis: The Maastricht Treaty was a dangerously misguided initiative at a critical moment in Europe's history. As of this writing there is no way of knowing if the damage done by the "Maastricht detour" is remediable. But it is clear that strong and visionary leadership will be required if the nations of Western Europe are to effect a change of course. It is also clear that such a dramatic change of direction will require the active and assertive participation of the United States.
An appropriate starting date for this study is 1985, the year that Mikhail Gorbachev became the youngest Soviet leader since Stalin, setting in motion the chain of events which were to transform international relations. It is relevant to my argument that according to the EC's own polls only 12 percent of the West European public believed in 1985 that there was a likelihood of war in the next 10 years, while 78 percent saw little or no likelihood.2 Dispite the expressions of concern by West European policymakers and intellectuals about Ronald Reagan's approach to foreign policy, West Europeans were fundamentally satisfied with their security situation in the mid-1980s.
Nor was security the only benefit that West Europeans derived from the cold war. On the economic front as well, West Europeans had never had it so good (problems of "Eurosclerosis" notwithstanding). The constraints imposed by the U.S.-Soviet competition had created an artificial hothouse environment in Western Europe which had facilitated the growth of the separate West European economies, despite the burdens imposed by their ambitious social welfare systems. The special circumstances of the cold war also encouraged progress toward economic integration within the EC. It was always good domestic politics to rail against American hegemony, of course, but such criticisms had become ritualistic over time, and in any event most West Europeans understood (even if they were not prepared to admit it) that Washington was the most benign of hegemons. Indeed, the trans-Atlantic relationship at times resembled nothing so much as the "reverse tribute system" of the 15th century Ming empire, which paid subordinate states more than it charged them in return for their public expressions of allegiance.
Washington's allies also were able to pursue relatively independent foreign policies, particularly after the late 1960s, within limits imposed by such formidable barriers as the Berlin Wall and Henry Kissinger. This was, in fact, a fairly wide field of play, as illustrated by the dramatic initiatives of European statesmen like Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt. 3 By 1990, however, the conditions which had favored Western Europe for over four decades had begun to disappear. The world was going through one of those rare periods that Charles de Gaulle once described as a "great reshuffling of the cards," and West European governments understood that they needed to act quickly and decisively in response to these dramatic changes. They chose to concentrate their energies and attention on the long-cherished goal of "completion" of the European Community. The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated at an EC summit in the southern Dutch city of Maastricht during the period December 9-11, 1991, became the focal point of this campaign.
The Maastricht Treaty has been widely heralded as the most important development in EC history since the Treaty of Rome, but few European citizens outside of Brussels have even a vague sense of its contents. Stanley Hoffmann contends that this is not due to the ignorance or apathy of the West European public:
One of the reasons why the majority of Danes and almost half of the French said no to the Maastricht treaty in 1992 was that the text was nearly incomprehensible. Drafted after the heads of state and government had left Maastricht, it was written by and for lawyers and bureaucrats and required legal experts to explain it.
The more clarification was provided, the more it became apparent that with the extension of the Community's competence came a vast tangle of procedures--cases in which decisions can be taken by a two-thirds majority, cases requiring unanimity, cases in which a two-thirds majority can decide because of a unanimous decision to allow it to do so--creating an almost impenetrable maze. 4 Although the specifics of the Maastricht Treaty are obscure, its purpose, as reflected in its priorities, is clear. Maastricht is first and foremost an economic document, designed to consolidate and expand upon the progress which had been made during the cold war toward the creation of a fully integrated West European economic system. Much of the groundwork had already been laid for the West European Single Market by the time that the Maastricht Summit was convened. Between 1950 and 1991 intra-EC trade had grown from 32.9 to 59.6 percent of all trade by EC countries and the Community was moving steadily forward toward its goal of eliminating all barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. 5 The treaty focused upon the logical next step in this process--full economic and monetary union, including agreements for a common EU currency and an EU central bank. Full economic and monetary integration was interpreted by most West European leaders as the overwhelming priority for EU governments and the precondition for any subsequent "widening" of the European Union to include any of the newly independent states of East or Central Europe. 6 Economic considerations were also at the core of the other key elements of the Maastricht compromise; institutional, political and social reforms designed to facilitate intra-EU cooperation and standardize practices among EU countries. Arguably the most controversial aspect of this package of reforms was the "Protocol on Social Policy" (and its appended Agreement) which builds upon earlier efforts to establish a comprehensive set of workers' rights and protections. Specifically, the "Social Protocol" commits signatories to "the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labor, the development of human resources with a view toward lasting high employment and the combatting of exclusion." 7 Because of the open-ended and intrusive nature of the Social Protocol, Great Britain chose to "opt out" of this portion of the treaty, and is unlikely to change its policy in the foreseeable future.
The treaty is much less ambitious in its plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union. Once again, the relevant sections of the treaty build upon earlier initiatives, in particular the Single European Act of 1987, by formally committing the EU "to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy...". Henceforth, the European Council will meet at least twice each year to formulate general guidelines for joint action in the foreign and security affairs of the member countries. These guidelines will then be addressed by the EU Council of Ministers in their regular meetings. For its part, the Council of Ministers is charged with attempting to reach a common position "on any matters of foreign and security policy of general interest. . ." It is important to note, however, that foreign and security affairs are still explicitly treated by the Maastricht Treaty as intergovernmental issues. Decisions are still unequivocally in the hands of the sovereign governments, and the whole process of CFSP is treated by the Maastricht Treaty as a distinct "pillar" of European Union which is still beyond the legal authority of both the EU Commission and the European Parliament. The treaty does allow for a system of qualified majority voting (QMV) on foreign and security matters, but only if all governments have agreed by consensus to permit it. Thus, for all intents and purposes the principle of unanimity is unaffected by the treaty.
The form and content of CFSP is also far from clear, as explained in an analysis of the treaty prepared for the UK House of Commons:
Due to the need to reach consensus, the CFSP treaty articles are extremely flexible and open to varying interpretations. Thus, for example, the notion that the EC has a common defense identity and could even have a common defence policy has been stated, but no timetable has been set for their implementation. 8 The sections of the Maastricht Treaty which deal with defense matters are, in fact, among the most ambivalent and conditional portions of the document. Several commentators have stressed the significance of Article J.4 (2) of the treaty, which establishes the Western European Union (WEU) as the future defense arm of the EU. It is not clear at this point, however, that the formal association of the WEU with the process of CFSP will make much of a difference in the campaign for the creation of a true European defense identity. Indeed, Jacques Delors, President of the EU Commission and a fervent supporter of a more independent foreign and security identity for Europe, expressed concern during the talks leading up to Maastricht that this approach diverted attention from the substance of CFSP and toward institutional matters.
9 Furthermore, the future of the WEU is unclear due to its legal association with both the EU and NATO, as reflected in the wording of the treaty which describes it as both ". . .the defense component of the European Union and the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." As I will have occasion to discuss further on, the WEU, NATO and the EU are currently engaged in a difficult process of making operational sense out of this unwieldy institutional arrangement.
The Maastricht Treaty thus satisfies only the second of Napoleon's two requirements for a good constitution ("short and vague"). But the complex and open-ended nature of the document is not as much of a problem for Europe as the implicit message that it has sent to West European publics. Neither the treaty itself, nor the politics which have surrounded it, have ever made clear what this new stage in European integration was supposed to accomplish, other than economies of scale in production and increased trade between EU countries. What, in the world, was the new European Union for?
Confusion about ends and means notwithstanding, the campaign for EU completion has remained the centerpiece of West European politics since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and in November 1993 the campaign achieved one of its interim goals with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This preoccupation--indeed, obsession--with building the European Union is understandable in light of the history of the European integration movement since World War II. This campaign reflects a confusion of West European priorities and a misreading of the realities of the post-cold war situation on the Continent. West European fascination with the EU experiment has diverted attention from two more important and immediate concerns: eastward and southward extension of the West European "zone of peace" and the articulation and defense of common West European values and interests in the world community.
Defenders of the EU experiment will be quick to observe that both of these goals are incorporated in the long-term plans for European Union as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty. There are five responses to this argument. First and foremost, the treaty does not accord a high enough priority to the aforementioned issues of outreach and comprehensive security. Second, events have been moving too quickly, and the Continent simply cannot afford the expenditure of time and energy which West Europeans have invested in Maastricht. The dramas associated with Maastricht ratification have already diverted too much attention away from the rapidly disintegrating situations just beyond the EU's borders. Third, in a few cases, the exclusionary politics of EU construction have actually exacerbated these dangerous situations. The tense relationship between the EU and Turkey is one important example. Fourth, ratification of Maastricht notwithstanding, the new circumstances of the post-cold war era make it virtually impossible for the nations of Western Europe to ever achieve the level of integration which would be required to speak with one voice on issues of foreign and defense affairs. And as the ongoing Bosnian crisis illustrates, anything less than full European Union consensus means paralysis. Fifth, conditions were already in place at the time of the Maastricht summit which permitted EU governments to consult and, where possible, coordinate their actions in support of shared liberal values and common interests. But the priority accorded to EU construction has undermined the process of flexible and ad hoc security cooperation in Western Europe.
To put the matter bluntly, the governments of Western Europe have been fiddling with the EU while the Eurasian Continent is beginning to burn. They are doing so partly out of inertia--because the process of EU construction was already far along by the time the cold war ended. But preoccupation with the EU is also attributable to self-delusion and abdication of responsibility, reflecting a struthious West European desire to remain isolated from the problems of the world.
For the foreseeable future, the construction of a reliable and effective Continental order must take precedence over the further consolidation of the European Union. This order must be based upon the preservation and advancement of six liberal values: the sponsorship of democracy, the growth of free markets, civilian control of the military, protection of individual and minority rights, peaceful resolution of disputes where possible and effective security cooperation where necessary. The nations of Western Europe are uniquely qualified to take the lead in this campaign for the construction of a new "Liberal Union" on the Eurasian continent.
10 They are also indispensable for its success. As a first step in the reorientation of their foreign policies, West European governments will have to follow Prime Minister John Major's advice to "raise their eyes" beyond the European Union. A new trans-Atlantic relationship will be impossible, however, until the nations of the European Union stop behaving in ways which Hedley Bull characterized during the early 1980s as "civilian power Europe"--a tendency to finesse, defer or disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional security. 13 Unfortunately, the preoccupation with EU construction has actually made this more difficult to achieve, by distracting West European governments from the unpleasant realities of the post-cold war era and encouraging them to focus instead upon the simpler problems of Maastricht. The extent to which West European governments rise to the challenges of the post-cold war world, and the role played by the United States and Canada in facilitating the process of foreign policy reorientation in Western Europe, will help to determine not only Europe's place in the world, but also Europe's location between what Stanley Hoffmann has referred to as the "Hobbesian floor" of perpetual warfare and the "Kantian ceiling" of perpetual peace.
What
14 The Maastricht Detour.
Dramatic structural change was never a realistic possibility for the nations of Western Europe during the cold war era. Nor was it easy to imagine a resolution to the East-West struggle which did not involve catastrophic war or the surrender of fundamental Western values. For these reasons, most experts shared Anton DePorte's 1979 opinion that "The European state system developed by the cold war and completed by the arming of Germany in 1955. . . .has a strong lease on the future." 15 Small wonder, then, that West European governments saw the collapse of the Berlin Wall as an historic opportunity for architectural change.
Lurking just behind the rhetoric of optimism and opportunity, however, was a pervasive concern about two questions which Alastair Buchan had raised as early as 1974. First, "If West European union was a product of the cold war, will the one survive the demise of the other?" Second, "What role should the European Community play on a wider stage. . .?" 16 West European governments responded to the first question by accelerating their campaign for EU "completion." Since they had no answer to the second question, they opted for Scarlett O'Hara's dictum--"I'll think about it tomorrow." But this strategy failed to take account of the fact that the two questions are interdependent, and that the world would not remain in the waiting room until a unified Western Europe was prepared to receive it.
The Politics of Completion.
It is worth mentioning at the outset that the vision of EU completion reflected in the Maastricht Treaty bears only a passing resemblance to the Europe of Jean Monnet and other leaders of the post-World War II European integration movement.In the final paragraph of his Memoirs, Monnet attempted to place his vision of Europe in its proper historical and global context: Have I said clearly enough that the Community we have created is not an end in itself? It is a process of change, continuing the same process which in an earlier period of history produced our national forms of life. Like our provinces in the past, our nations today must learn to live together under common rules and institution freely arrived at. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present: they cannot ensure their own progress or control their future. And the Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organized world of tomorrow. 17 Monnet's concluding remarks demonstrate his appreciation of two points which are fundamental to my argument: that the construction of a European Union must be guided by the goal of establishing an enduring European order, and that a peaceful and prosperous Europe must serve as the cornerstone of an "organized world." Both of these themes had been articles of faith for the early proponents of European union, many of whom had formulated their ideas as members of the resistance movement in World War II. These individuals had seen firsthand how nationalism could metastasize into Nazism and "ethnic cleansing," and they were committed to nothing less than the transformation of world politics.
18
By the mid 1950s, however, these postwar visionaries had either been marginalized or forced to pursue much more mundane goals. Monnet, whose greatest strengths were in administration, proved to be particularly effective at building European cooperation slowly and incrementally. Over the next two decades he concentrated his efforts on the "functional linkage" of specific economic activities. As a result, by the time that Monnet disbanded his Action Committee for a United States of Europe in 1975, the Community had nine members and was well on its way to the achievement of a full common market. 19 Monnet emphasized economic cooperation because of his own background and training in international finance and because he saw this realm of activity as having the greatest potential for progress. He never lost sight, however, of the need for Europe to become something more. Indeed, his commitment to broader western values and interests made him vulnerable to de Gaulle's well-known criticism that he was a "very good American." For its part, the United States encouraged the channeling of European energies into the campaign for economic unification during the first half of the cold war era. Economics was viewed by Washington as the least problematic area for European cooperation, since it did not directly challenge America's status as leader of the anti-Soviet alliance. 20 The construction of an efficient economic community was also associated with the long-term American goal of getting the West Europeans to carry more of the financial burden of the common security effort. Consequently, Washington managed its financial and diplomatic relations with Western Europe in such a way as to encourage economic union.
21
As the process of economic integration moved forward--from free trade to customs union to common market--discussions of political and defense unification were towed along in the Community's wake. There were some notable attempts at real progress in the field of "high politics" of course, including the 1976 Tindemans Report (which called for enhanced foreign policy coordination), the 1984 reactivation of the Western European Union (which has become the focal point of the debate about the EU's defense identity), the 1987 Single European Act (which brought European Political Cooperation--EPC--within the Community's institutional and legal purview) and those portions of the Maastricht Treaty which committed the EU to a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 22 These positive developments have nonetheless been eclipsed by the campaign for EU economic integration. 23 The preoccupation with the economic aspects of West European cooperation is a perverse expression of the theory that "the business of government is business." To the extent that it has become institutionalized in Brussels and established as the overwhelming priority in the calculations of West European governments, it has encouraged the politics of self-delusion and irresponsibility within the EU.
The steady growth of the EU's economic institutions and the preoccupation with the economic aspects of public life have also taken their toll on the relationship between West European governments and publics. Since the early 1970s one of the most enduring themes among European commentators has been the mass public's loss of a sense of mission and excitement regarding the future of Europe. Why is it so hard for these commentators to recognize the roots of this problem in the replacement of the postwar vision of Europe as a source of world order with a vision of Europe as a "supermarket"? At present, the effects of this loss of direction can be seen in public opinion polls (only 40 percent of EU citizens expressed support for the Maastricht Treaty in a spring 1993 Eurobarometer poll) and in the tepid and conditional support that the EU received in those countries which undertook referendums on the treaty. 24 A sense of loss of direction has also contributed to the recent trend towards regionalization and the decline of executive authority within many of the member countries of the European Union.
25 These problems are exacerbated by the situation of economic stagnation which has spread throughout Western Europe over the last 2 years.
The Illusion of Privacy.
In an article entitled "Goodbye to a United Europe?," Stanley Hoffmann surveyed many of the problems listed above. He noted that there was a "democratic deficit" within the EU as a result of "the Byzantine complexity of the whole structure," and its inability to instill a sense of loyalty or even identification among West European publics. Hoffmann nonetheless concluded that "This does not mean. . .that the policy of European integration will be abandoned: there is no turning back."
26 According to this line of argument, which reflects the dominant thinking among EU governments and policy analysts, the only solution to Western Europe's problems is to persevere in, and where possible accelerate, the process of EU consolidation, particularly in the economic sphere. For this to be accomplished, however, West Europeans cannot allow themselves to be "distracted" by complex and threatening issues beyond the EU's borders.
The problem is not a new one. As Andrew Shonfield noted in his 1973 Reith Lecture, "In the early days of the European Common Market, the Six managed to achieve a kind of illusion of privacy within the international system. . .; as though they were living inside a charmed circle bounded entirely by their own problems and preoccupations. . ." 27 In fact, this "charmed circle" became even smaller and stronger in the minds of many EC policymakers as the process of postwar decolonization forced key West European governments to concentrate their interests and efforts at home. As West European governments adapted to the dual pressures of decolonization and superpower hegemony, the European Community became the central focus of West European politics. None of this would have been possible if it had not been for the artificially protected environment of the cold war. Indeed, the Community was at least as much a creature of the special circumstances of the cold war as was the North Atlantic Alliance. Ironically, the end of the cold war was interpreted by most commentators as the moment of opportunity for the EC, and the death knell for NATO. Both predictions were anchored in incorrect assumptions about the ability of these institutions to function on a larger international stage. I will discuss NATO's post-cold war record further on, and focus here upon the EU. The EU members' desire to preserve the "charmed circle" after the cold war is illustrated by its handling of three issues: the EU's place in the world economy, Western Europe's quest for a distinct cultural identity, and the challenge of contributing to a viable system of regional and global order.
The Politics of Economic Exclusion.
Immediately following World War II the United States engaged key wartime allies in discussions aimed at the creation of a globalized system of nondiscriminatory trade, which culminated in the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in October 1947. The United States had to settle for a less-than-total commitment to worldwide free trade in the final GATT agreement, however, so that key European powers (Britain in particular) could preserve their special trade relationships with former colonies. It was nonetheless understood (at least by Washington) that such arrangements would be phased out over time. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) as a first step toward the creation of a European Economic Community presented a more fundamental challenge to the GATT system. The United States nonetheless acquiesced to European requests for an exemption from the constraints of GATT, because it envisioned a strong and unified European Economic Community as an effective bulwark against Soviet aggression and subversion. Washington's decision to support the EC's request for an exemption from the rules of nondiscriminatory world trade was motivated primarily by political and strategic considerations. Over time, however, a rich theoretical literature developed which supported the proposition that preferential arrangements were not necessarily in conflict with the long-term goals of globalized free trade, and that under certain circumstances regional customs unions and free trade arrangements might even advance the cause of a liberal world economy.
28
But as the number of preferential systems has grown over the last four decades, this theoretical literature has become less and less relevant to the policy debate about the place of such arrangements in the GATT system, largely because each case is sui generis. According to the GATT Secretariat, over 80 preferential systems currently claim exemption from the nondiscrimination rules of the GATT. These arrangements run the gamut from sectoral free trade agreements to comprehensive customs unions, and they are in various stages of completion. This has made it very difficult for scholars to monitor or compare preferential systems in order to make judgments about their effects on the global liberal trade regime. It is generally conceded that many of these arrangements do not comply with the specific requirements of the GATT exemption guidelines (Article XXIV of the GATT). To date, however, no request for an exemption has been refused, since the GATT has neither the institutional mechanisms nor the clout to take such action. 29 The situation has reached the point where the "tail" of preferential arrangements is now wagging the "dog" of GATT, to the detriment of global economic welfare.
Professor John Jackson of the University of Michigan blames the precedents set by the European Community for GATT's inability to control the spread of preferential schemes. In particular, he cites the international community's acquiescence to the EC's creation of a multilayered system of trade preferences for former colonies as a key factor in the progressive degradation of the GATT's legal discipline. 30 Other commentators (mostly Americans) see the EU as a major factor in the spread of protectionist sentiments among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments. According to Joan Edelman Spero, for example:
In building this (EC) trading system, the Community has weakened the principle of nondiscrimination basic to the GATT and has thus posed challenges to liberalization of the larger international system. In addition, its preoccupation with building a common market and its continuing political fragmentation weakened the EC's ability to play a central management role in the multilateral system. 31 Robert Gilpin, meanwhile, finds the roots of EC protectionism in Europe's traditions of state intervention in the market:
Having pioneered in the first and second phases of the Industrial revolution, Europeans became poignantly aware of the fact that the global locus of technological innovation now lay outside of Europe. In these circumstances extensive trade liberalization was increasingly regarded as incompatible with the preservation of the welfare state, the survival of European industry, and the EEC itself. . . .Therefore, a powerful tendency to retreat behind the protective walls of the European Common Market and, in some cases, national trade barriers has developed in response to what the Europeans call 'the new international division of labor.' 32 To the extent that we can speak of a basis for consensus on the question of regionalism versus globalism, it has been provided by Jagdish Bhagwati, an adviser to the GATT talks and one of the world's foremost authorities on commercial policy. Bhagwati calls for tighter GATT standards for granting Article XXIV exemptions ". . .so that these arrangements more readily serve as building blocks of, rather than stumbling blocks to, GATT-wide free trade." In particular, Bhagwati recommends that exemptions be granted on the condition that preference groupings "look favorably at accepting new members into a union . . ." 33 This is the point at which we would seem to be on firm ground in criticizing the ongoing European Union experiment.
As discussed earlier in this study, Jean Monnet never envisioned Europe as a goal in itself, but rather as an essential component in a global system of order and prosperity. This should still be the standard against which all EU initiatives are judged. Unfortunately, however, the politics of "completion" associated with Maastricht have encouraged West European governments to accord such a high priority to intraregional issues that the longer term vision of the EU as a pan-European and global actor has been severely attenuated and obscured. This is particularly true in the economic realm, where Maastricht has permitted West European governments to make a virtue out of exclusion.
Concern about EU self-absorption is most often heard among the governments of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia).
34 This is not surprising, since these countries have such long traditions of economic involvement with Western Europe. When viewed from Warsaw or Prague, the EU experiment looks like an attempt artificially to disrupt the historic patterns of trade and investment which characterized Mitteleuropa. Defenders of the EU will reject this characterization of the European Union's relationship with the Visegrad states, citing the European Association Agreements, which provide the context for trade liberalization with the Central European governments, and the PHARE program (Poland, Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy) which funnels aid to the EU's neighbors to the East. On closer inspection, however, neither the terms of the Association Agreements nor the size of the PHARE aid package are reasons for rejoicing among the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. 35 The Association Agreements have come in for special criticism among the Visegrad states, on the grounds that they unfairly favor key EU economic sectors, including food, textiles and steel. 36 The time frame of 5-10 years for the gradual lifting of trade barriers is also a source of frustration for the Visegrad governments. 37 Polish government representatives have attempted to attach some numbers to the disadvantageous terms of the Association Agreements. According to one study by the Polish Foreign Ministry, EU exports to the Visegrad states grew by 31 percent in 1992, while EU imports from these same states increased by only 10 percent. 39 A group of Polish economists has calculated that by the end of the 10-year period of the agreements, every dollar of increased industrial output in Poland will be more than matched by $2.26 in extra imports from the EU. As a result, the Polish trade deficit with the EU will have worsened by $322 million per year if existing quotas and tariffs are maintained. 40 Disagreements about how much is enough are inevitable in this type of situation, of course. But there is a more fundamental concern that the nations of Eastern and Central Europe harbor regarding the EU. Many representatives of Eastern and Central European governments have become convinced, reassuring EU rhetoric notwithstanding, that the West Europeans will never actually extend full membership to them. EU governments have encouraged this suspicion by the priority that they have accorded to the Maastricht agenda for the construction of EU monetary union. Indeed, the EU Commission stated during the negotiations for the Association Agreements (1991) that the issue of EU membership "would not be affected by the conclusion of association agreements." 41 Nor have the governments of the former Warsaw Pact been reassured by more recent EU pronouncements, such as the official statement issued at the close of the December 1992 Edinburgh Summit, which formally commits the EU to expansion into Central Europe but provides no timetable for accession. 42 As the aforementioned statement by Prime Minister Major makes clear, EU governments are under pressure from domestic constituencies to resist the requests of the Visegrad states for a timetable for affiliation. But the logic of EU completion which is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty reinforces this sense of exclusion. By committing the West European governments to such goals as a common currency, a common central bank and open borders, Maastricht makes the issue of new membership vastly more complex and difficult. As long as West European governments continue to accord priority to the achievement of these long-term goals, it will be hard for the Visegrad states to obtain full membership in the EU.
When West European governments look for examples of non-exclusionary regional economic cooperation, they might consider the recent record of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). While the initial agreement involves only Canada, Mexico and the United States, it has been interpreted by all three governments as the first step in a campaign of hemispheric cooperation. Furthermore, NAFTA's economic agreements have been presented as part of a larger process of regional reconciliation on such issues as environmental protection, human rights and democratization. As such, NAFTA fulfills not only Bhagwati's standard for consistency with the principles of GATT, but also some of the requirements for north-south cooperation in a post-cold war era. 43 The NAFTA analogy is very popular among the nations of North Africa and the Middle East, who are even more worried than the EU's Eastern neighbors about being progressively isolated from Western Europe. 44 The most serious problems facing the nations which inhabit the southern and southeastern littorals of the Mediterranean are the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, environmental pollution and overpopulation. All three problems are related to economic underdevelopment. West European governments, separately and collectively, have taken some useful initiatives to assist North African and Middle Eastern states to cope with these challenges. For instance, negotiations are underway to establish guidelines for the creation of a free trade relationship between Morocco and the EU, an arrangement that other North African governments hope can be expanded over time to include the other members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania). The EU has also committed $625 million for environmental cleanup in the southern Mediterranean over the next 5 years. 45 Europe's southern neighbors see these actions as useful first steps, but they warn that much more will have to be done by the EU to address the root problems of poverty and overpopulation in the region. In the absence of a major campaign of economic assistance to the southern region, Europe must be prepared for a succession of crises in the Middle East and North Africa, which will inevitably spill across the Mediterranean.
The Politics of Cultural Exclusion.
Any attempt to formulate a long-term EU policy of economic cooperation with the nations of North Africa and the Middle East must necessarily confront the emotional issue of culture. Samuel Huntington has argued that the end of the cold war has set the stage for a worldwide clash of cultures. 46 Unfortunately, the politics of EU consolidation exacerbates the risks associated with this trend, and invites ugly speculation about the creation of a new Christian union to confront the forces of Islam.
As previously mentioned, the original leaders of the European integration movement were guided by a highly idealistic vision of Europe and its proper role in the world. It was a vision anchored in three liberal values: democracy, free markets, and opposition to malignant and aggressive forms of nationalism. It drew both its intellectual and its emotional strength from the anti-fascist crusade of World War II, and its normative references were transatlantic rather than European. This helps to explain why it was so easy for Washington to accept the European integration movement, and why the politics of European union were entirely compatible with the politics of anti-Communist containment during the cold war. As Hugh Seton-Watson observed in 1985, "The division that matters today is not between Europe and the rest of the world, but between socialism and capitalism." 47 When the cold war came to an end there was a predictable scramble for new normative symbols to guide the campaign for European Union. European leaders were acutely aware of the risk that, absent the Soviet threat, Europe would become associated with nothing more than the stultifying bureaucracy of the EC Commission and the Baroque politics of exchange rate adjustment. Unfortunately, as they rummaged through history for a more ennobling vision of Europe, the cupboard was sparse, if not entirely bare. Some of the most explicit attempts to articulate a unique vision of Europe--Napoleon's Franco-centric idea, for example, and Joseph Goebbels' racist notion--were nothing more than self-serving propaganda, and altogether unacceptable. Other contributions to the debate--by scholars such as Erasmus and rulers such as Alexander I--were too vague and general.
Charlemagne provided some useful geographic and ideational referents. His Frankish empire, which reached its peak around 800 A.D., covered much of what would later become the original six-member European Community. It was characterized by a rudimentary common culture, based on educational reform, a code of moral conduct and imperial patronage of the arts. But the Carolingian empire was too closely tied to the Christian Church, and too explicitly anti-Muslim, to be an ideal model for Europe's future. 48 Indeed, Charlemagne's empire obtained its general boundaries, its geographic cohesion and its sense of mission from the fact that the expansion of Islam in the early 8th century had pushed Christianity back across the Mediterranean.
Unfortunately ) and Italy (the Movimento Sociale Italiano), and they associate these developments with what they see as a callous disregard on the part of West European governments for the fate of the Bosnian Muslims. The EU has attempted to build new bridges to the Arab world, by means of aid programs and bilateral economic and cultural initiatives. They have also made efforts to suppress racist and nativist trends within their respective countries. But the priority that they accord to "deepening" EU cooperation has made it difficult for these governments to rebuff claims that the nations of Western Europe are developing an "us-them" attitude toward the outside world in general and the Islamic world in particular.
From the point of view of the nations of North Africa, especially, the consolidation of the EU represents a rejection of centuries of European history. According to this argument, Europe has forgotten its Mediterranean roots, with the result that it has discounted both the risks and the opportunities that are present in the South and Southeast. West European governments argue that they can best contribute to positive change in the South and Southeast by first fulfilling their vocation for European Unity. But can Europe's Arab and Turkish neighbors wait that long? And will the campaign for EU consolidation only serve further to isolate the nations of Western Europe from their Mediterranean neighbors?
It is, in fact, somewhat misleading to speak of creating new bridges between the EU and Islam, since a substantial Muslim presence is already well established within Western Europe. It has been estimated that there are 1.5 million Muslims in Britain, 3 million in France, 1.9 million in Germany and 1.7 million in Italy. And as Anthony Hartley has observed, "The complexities of the Islamic settlement in Europe are, after all, not going to go away. Indeed, it is likely that the numbers of Muslim immigrants will increase as instability in the Middle East and poverty in Africa drive migrants across the Mediterranean." 49 The challenge for European governments will be to adapt their cultural agendas to this reality, particularly in the realm of education, without according Muslim immigrants "special status [and] 
51 And until Western European governments are willing and able to pursue a much more inclusive economic, political and social agenda, they will have great difficulty in refuting such accusations.
Even with the best of intentions, however, this will not be easy. The most ambitious attempt to bridge the cultural divide which separates the northern and southern littorals of the Mediterranean was the series of preliminary discussions between France, Italy, Spain and Portugal and the nations of the Maghreb aimed at establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) modeled on the CSCE. Under the leadership of former Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, these talks began in 1990. Three "baskets" of issues were discussed, in accordance with the CSCE model: politics and security, economic cooperation, and human rights. To date, however, there has been very little progress due to the disruptive effects of both the Gulf War and the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process. And even if the CSCM talks are restarted, they are not likely to result in an ambitious document comparable to the Helsinki Final Act, for three important reasons. First, the situation is no longer characterized by the dual hegemony of the cold war. Consequently, specific disagreements between European and Maghrebi participants cannot be resolved by superpower intervention. Second, the clear priority on the part of the southern Mediterranean participants is closer economic ties to, and more aid from, the EU. But as we have already had occasion to discuss, there are strict limits to what North African and Middle Eastern states can expect from an EU that is overwhelmingly preoccupied with its own economic agenda. Third, preliminary discussions relating to Basket III of CSCM have demonstrated that there is a chasm between the northern and southern participants on fundamental issues of human rights. Indeed, negotiators came away from these discussions speaking not of a long-term goal of formulating a common body of human rights but rather of developing guidelines for "tolerance" of distinct traditions of human rights. Turkey presents the EU with a unique test of its commitment to both economic and cultural inclusion in a post-cold war setting. Ankara is presently at a turning point in its decades-long quest for acceptance as a European nation, and its prospects will be largely determined by the European Union. If managed properly, the EU should be able to exploit its relationship with Ankara to enhance its leverage with the nations of the Middle East and Central Asia. More importantly, close cooperation with Turkey will help the EU to directly confront the issues of economic and cultural exclusion which currently undermine its ability to play a positive and proactive role in world affairs.
To date, Turkey has experienced considerable frustration in its efforts to establish an advantageous relationship with the nations of Western Europe. Throughout the cold war era, Ankara's efforts to integrate itself into the political, economic and cultural life of Europe were consistently rebuffed by the EC, despite of the fact that Turkey worked closely with these nations under the NATO umbrella. 53 And now that the cold war has ended Ankara finds itself in the frustrating position of having to once again establish its bona fides with the West in order to assure itself of a place at the European table.
During fall 1990, then-President Turgut Ozal embarked upon a dramatic, and risky, campaign to resolve this situation. President Ozal's decision to place Turkey in the forefront of the allied coalition against Saddam Hussein jeopardized his country's physical security, at a time when allied intelligence services were warning of a massive Iraqi missile threat coupled with the possibility of chemical and biological warheads. Ankara could take some reassurance from the public expressions of support by NATO governments, and from the deployment of the air component of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF/AIR) to Southeast Turkey. But Ozal was also aware of the domestic debates within key allied countries (Germany in particular) about whether they would be obliged to intervene in the event of an Iraqi attack against Turkey, in retaliation for U.S. air strikes from Turkish air bases. 54 Ankara nonetheless maintained its commitment to the anti-Iraq coalition, and played a key role in the conflict by providing bases and by deploying of over 180,000 troops along the Turkey-Iraq border. Ozal's contribution to the Gulf War represented a modified version of Turkey's traditional cold war strategy of contributing to Western security in the hopes of obtaining economic and political rewards. The results, thus far, have been mixed. On the positive side of the ledger, Turkey began the post-cold war era on the right side of the victorious anti-Iraq coalition. As President Ozal stated in March 1991, "For the first time in 200 years, Turkey has allied itself with the winners of a war. Siding with the winners is always advantageous." 56 Being on the winning side has given Ankara more than bragging rights. It has established Ankara's right to participate in post-war decisionmaking about the future of Iraq and the future of any collective security arrangement for the Persian Gulf region. Being on the winning side also meant that Turkey was able to seek compensation for at least a portion of the estimated $9 billion that it lost during the Gulf crisis, and Turkish corporations are participating in the reconstruction of Kuwait. Finally, Ankara's participation in the war significantly increased Turkey's stock in Washington for a period of time. U.S. policymakers demonstrated their appreciation for Turkey's role in the Gulf War by providing emergency economic and military aid to Ankara during the conflict. The Bush administration also pressed for a foreign aid authorization for Turkey which was not constrained by the 7:10 military aid formula, vis-a-vis Greece, which has been a source of Turkish frustration for many years. 57 Washington also made it clear that it was prepared to be more accommodating on the issue of U.S.-Turkish trade, by permitting an overall 100 percent increase in Turkish textile exports to the United States. By the end of President Bush's term, however, Ankara was once again beginning to feel unappreciated by the United States as other issues and actors occupied Washington's attention. Turkey has found even less reason to celebrate the results of its collaboration with West European governments during the Gulf War. From Ankara's point of view, the litmus test of Europe's friendship is EU membership, which Turkey has been waiting for since 1964, when it was granted an associate status by the Community. Thus, the EU's decision to delay indefinitely the decision on full Turkish membership and its subsequent decision to establish association agreements with the EFTA countries as a first step toward their ultimate accession into the EU were viewed as gratuitously insulting by Ankara. 58 There are two related reasons for the EU's lack of appreciation for Turkey's role in the confrontation with Saddam. First, EU officials continue to compartmentalize security, politics and economics, in spite of the Maastricht commitment to give the EU responsibility in all three issue areas. Second, the nations of Western Europe are still guided by the logic of "civilian power Europe" which encourages EU governments to accord a much higher priority to issues of economic self-interest than to issues of regional security. As a consequence of these two factors, Turkey's contribution to Gulf security was duly noted by its European neighbors, and promptly forgotten.
One aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was especially disturbing for Turkey. To the extent that it helped to revitalize the WEU and encourage a new round of debate about the future of a European defense identity, Maastricht's plans for a CFSP threatened to transform the persistent Greek-Turkish dispute from an "in-house" struggle between Athens and Ankara into an "us-them" conflict between Turkey and Western Europe. The WEU attempted to finesse this issue by offering full membership to Greece (decision taken at Rome, November 20, 1992) while inviting Turkey to become an associate member on the day that the Hellenic Republic officially joins the organization. The compromise is less than satisfactory from Ankara's point of view. 59 In a 1992 article, Professor Duygu Sezer reflected the frustration of most of his countrymen relating to all of these post-cold war developments:
Turkey has failed the test in the eyes of Western Europe. But in a very important sense, Europe has also failed the test--the test of a broader vision. The undeniable political and cultural affinity and rapport that had grown out of four decades of ideological bonding and security cooperation was discarded as soon as the enemy disappeared, paving the way for Europe to recover its sense of security and unity. Turkey was largely pushed aside by the dominant political forces in Europe, particularly the EC.
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In fact, concern for Turkish sensitivities has not been very important in the ongoing intra-European debate about the future of Turkey's economic relationship with the EU. To date, the nations of Western Europe have not been convinced that the economic and political benefits of Turkish membership in the EU outweigh the perceived costs. They have agreed, however, to enter into a customs union arrangement with Ankara by 1995. 61 Hopefully, this arrangement will lead to closer collaboration between Ankara and the nations of Western Europe and make it easier for Turkey to demonstrate its potential value to the EU as a bridge, not only to Europe's southern and southeastern neighbors, but to the newly established governments of Central Asia as well.
The EU's Contribution To Regional and Global Order.
Policies of economic and cultural exclusion would be defensible if the European Union was at least making a contribution to pan-European security. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. As mentioned previously, the most visible initiative taken by West European governments so far is the formal integration of the WEU into the European Union. To date, however, the WEU is still attempting to establish a distinct diplomatic and military identity for itself, and the EU remains light years away from the goal of a common foreign and security policy articulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Two post-cold war crises--in Kuwait and in the former Yugoslavia--illustrate the problems that the EU faces as it pursues this goal.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq accomplished its historic aim of annexing Kuwait, by means of a brutally efficient Blitzkrieg. The invasion elicited almost universal condemnation, for three reasons. First, it was such a flagrant challenge to the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression upon which the entire body of international law is based. Second, when viewed against the background of Iraq's recent victory in the Iran-Iraq War and Baghdad's development of a massive military arsenal, the invasion of Kuwait appeared to be the first step in a campaign of military domination of the Persian Gulf region. Third, the international community faced the prospect of Iraqi control of a substantial portion of the world's oil supply--particularly if the invasion of Kuwait was followed by the conquest of Saudi Arabia. Thus, when a condemnatory U.N. Security Council resolution (number 660) was introduced immediately after the invasion, it obtained the unanimous support of all current members, including Cuba.
As the strongest nation in the international community, the United States felt a special responsibility to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. But Washington also understood that it was essential that the situation not devolve into a bilateral confrontation between America and Iraq. The United States moved quickly, therefore, to help raise the issue of the invasion of Kuwait in the U.N. and within the Atlantic Community. Washington was gratified by the speed and ease with which an international coalition was formed against Saddam. This was because Washington and London made it clear to the international community from the first days of the crisis that they were prepared to bear the brunt of the political and military risks of punishing Iraq. During the next several months, however, the United States and Britain came to appreciate the wisdom of Napoleon's observation that "If I must fight, let it be against a coalition." As the deadline for military confrontation approached, Saddam used various strategies to disrupt the coalition and, in particular, to drive a wedge between Washington and the nations of the European Community.
One potentially disruptive issue was the fate of U.S. and West European hostages in Iraq. EU governments had agreed not to act independently to obtain the release of their respective citizens held hostage in Baghdad. Saddam nonetheless engaged in what Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh call a "hostage lottery" to break down the resolve of selected Community members. In the end, the EU succeeded in preserving a common front on the hostage question, although the policy was severely frayed around the edges by the time that Operation DESERT SHIELD became Operation DESERT STORM.
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If the EU's common front on the hostage question was a source of satisfaction to Washington, the United States was less impressed by the Europeans' willingness to offer military commitments as the deadline for confrontation approached. Then-Congressman Les Aspin summarized the American mood in late November: "Europe has not fully measured up to expectations. . .The bulk of European allies have given solid (if painless) political support, passable economic support, and mere token military support." 63 Key European Community members also began to express disagreements with the United States over the question of how much diplomacy was required before the international community opted for military action against Saddam. France was particularly anxious to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, both for its own sake and as a way of bolstering its position as a European and world leader. But the quest for a distinct European diplomatic option in the Gulf crisis foundered on the formidable opposition of Margaret Thatcher (and subsequently, John Major). Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh summarized the EC's dilemma as follows: "The problem with a separate and ostentatious diplomatic effort was that it must either convey the agreed coalition message, which would be pointless, or convey a different message, which risked a split in the coalition." 64 As the deadline for confrontation approached, the French government thought that it had found a way to distinguish the European position from the policies of the coalition leader. French President Mitterrand began to speak about the possibility of encouraging greater negotiating flexibility from Baghdad by offering to link the resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute to the larger issue of the Arab-Israeli dispute. With the support of Holland, however, the United Kingdom rebuffed this attempt to establish a separate EU foreign policy at Israel's expense, on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the efforts of the international coalition.
U.S.-EU relations during the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM were a model of conflict avoidance in a situation in which all parties recognized that nothing would be gained by a public shouting match. Since the United States and Great Britain were prepared to act in tandem, and the world community was prepared to support, or at least defer to, U.S.-UK action, the European Union's options were limited, and its direct costs manageable. Key EU governments nonetheless scrambled for a way to avoid even the indirect costs of open war between Iraq and the coalition. Ultimately, these governments failed to identify a third way between war and acquiescence to aggression. Bruce Watson has observed that "The Gulf War revealed vividly the cracks in European unity, and the European reaction was complete with indecision, name-calling, attacks on fellow nations--a genuinely mediocre performance." 65 This is too harsh a judgment. For the process of European Political Consultation facilitated intergovernmental discussions, the formulation of common embargo positions, and the articulation of national differences. But the fact that the EU was able to achieve even this level of internal consensus is attributable to the preemptive leadership of the United States and the United Kingdom. It cannot be interpreted as a sign of progress toward the goal of a common EU foreign and defense identity.
If the differences which surfaced within the EU during the Gulf crisis were muted by the fact that Washington and London had essentially preempted the policy debate, no such preemptive influence has existed during the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the most important difference between the two crises (and there are more differences than similarities) is the conspicuous absence of American leadership in the Balkan situation. At least initially, this appears to have been the result of a clear decision by Washington to use the Yugoslavian case as a means of raising the consciousness of West European governments regarding their security responsibilities in the post-cold war era. Judging from the EU's handling of the Yugoslavian catastrophe, Washington's strategy failed. This is neither the time nor the place for an in-depth analysis of the convolutions of the Yugoslavian crisis. Only when the reconfiguration of the former Yugoslavia is complete will scholars be in a position to analyze this event. It is, however, possible at this time to offer a few summary observations regarding the EU's participation to date in the breakup of Yugoslavia. First, it is worth responding to the frequently-heard claim that the timing of the implosion of Yugoslavia was unfortunate, because the process of EU construction was not yet far enough along to cope with this crisis. On the contrary, it can be argued that if Western Europe had by some miracle been spared serious security challenges for another two or three years it would have made it even harder for the EU to cope with threats when they finally surfaced. This is because West European governments would in all likelihood have used that breathing space to consolidate those "civilian" habits of thought and behavior which had been developed among Washington's allies since the mid 1960s and enshrined in the Maastricht process at the end of the cold war. This approach to world politics guided most of the governments of Western Europe as they strove to articulate their separate national interests in the Balkans, and it effectively paralyzed their efforts to take the kinds of actions that were necessary.
During the spring and summer of 1991, as West European governments were preparing for Maastricht and adjusting their policies to the reality of a unified Germany, Yugoslavia was treated as an annoyance and an inconvenience rather than an immediate regional security crisis. EU governments were content to support the position taken by the United States during this time, which was based on a commitment to the preservation of the Yugoslavian state and a desire for the peaceful resolution of disputes and the protection of minority rights between and within the separate Yugoslav republics. As the conflict intensified, however, the risks of spillover into the Balkans and Central Europe became more apparent and the possibility that Washington would take the lead in responding to events in Yugoslavia became more remote. Under these circumstances, the EU began to involve itself more directly in the Yugoslavian situation, sponsoring 14 negotiated cease-fires and a major peace conference during the second half of the year. Many critics of these early attempts at conflict resolution complained that the Community was mismanaging this or that specific aspect of the situation. But John Zametica has correctly observed that ". . .this was a case of impotence being confused with incompetence." 66 The impotence was more psychological than physical or organizational, but paralyzing nonetheless. As the Serbs brushed aside one cease-fire after the next, EU representatives became increasingly bewildered by actions that were not in accord with their own assumptions about the fundamentally benign and rationalistic nature of international relations.
In the face of such bewilderment, any strongly held and coherent opinion can take on special force. By the end of the year, two such opinions had come to the fore within Western Europe: a widely held judgment that the EU must resist the temptation to be drawn into the Yugoslavian crisis by some open-ended military action and a growing conviction that the breakup of Yugoslavia was inevitable. But West European governments also suspected that the collapse of the Yugoslavian state would ignite a chaotic multifront war. Not surprisingly, public speculations along these lines became increasingly unwelcome throughout Western Europe as the EU edged closer to a policy of public support for regional self-determination.
Many experts were surprised, and more than a few were alarmed, by the assertive role which Germany played in moving the Community toward this fundamental policy shift. For its part, the German government has since argued that it came to this decision grudgingly, in response to the repeated acts of aggression by the Serbian government during the summer and fall of 1991. Indeed, Bonn has since claimed that "Germany always supported former Yugoslavia and had nothing to gain from its collapse." 67 Nor is there reason to question Germany's assertion that "The attempt by the Serbian leadership to act as the champion of supposedly pan-Yugoslavian interests was merely intended to disguise its real objective: the unification of all Serbs within one state." 68 Unfortunately, however, neither Germany nor the other members of the EU were prepared to draw the obvious conclusions from Belgrade's campaign of aggression in the face of repeated West European efforts at mediation--that something more than rhetoric and economic carrots and sticks was required, and wholly justified, to avoid disaster. Under these circumstances, regional self-determination evolved, with Bonn's sponsorship, as the Community's political solution to a situation which had already proven to be beyond the scope of political solution. 69 As the end of the year approached, regional self-determination became the EU's preferred coercive instrument for encouraging Serbian reasonableness, despite the facts that the preservation of the Yugoslavian state was still widely perceived by the outside world as the best outcome and that virtually everyone inside and outside of Yugoslavia agreed that its breakup would not occur peacefully.
This, then, is the major indictment against West European handling of the Yugoslavian crisis: that the EU took public responsibility for the Yugoslavian situation but was unprepared to accept the implications of that responsibility. By summer 1991 many EU spokesmen were treating the Yugoslavian crisis as the opportunity to establish the Community as an important actor in world affairs (recall EU negotiator Jacques Poos' now-infamous statement that "This is the hour of Europe"). Despite the fact that West European governments did not have a plan to guide their foreign policy at this time, there was a widespread sense of optimism about the EU's diplomatic role in the crisis. Guided by the logic of "civilian power," however, the EU rejected the option of punitive military action if cease-fires, arbitration and mediation proved unsuccessful.
The possibility of punitive military action against Serbia was discussed within the EU from time to time as the crisis unfolded. France took the lead in most of these discussions, favoring the creation of an "interposition" force under the auspices of the WEU. Throughout fall 1991, as successive EU-brokered ceasefires collapsed, France obtained the support of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands for the principle of military intervention. There was no shortage of potential problems with this policy (not the least being that neither Germany nor Italy were prepared to contribute troops to any EU interventionary force). But the principal barrier proved to be the unwavering opposition of Great Britain, for two reasons. First, London was concerned about setting a precedent that might tip the scales in favor of an EU/WEU military "pillar" at a time when the future of NATO was uncertain. Second, based upon its own experience in Northern Ireland, Britain was especially chary of any West European military involvement in the Balkans that might prove harder to end than to begin. 70 These and other concerns were valid, or at least debatable, during fall 1991. But the EU's subsequent decision to support regional self-determination altered the circumstances and changed the role of the EU in the Yugoslavian crisis. It imposed new moral responsibilities on the governments of West Europe and should not have been undertaken without some public commitments to protect individuals or communities that became victims as a result of the breakup of the Yugoslavian state. Instead, the EU chose this moment to pass the baton to the United Nations, and to call for international peacekeeping, despite the fact that the EU's own experience over the previous six months had demonstrated that peacekeeping, in and of itself, was dangerously inadequate.
In a situation in which the overriding sentiment within the EU opposed military involvement, the option of regional selfdetermination was as close as the EU was prepared to come to a strategy of coercive diplomacy. The people of Bosnia-Herzegovina have paid the highest price for this policy-by-default. The Bosnian government had special reason to fear the breakup of the Yugoslavian state, because of the region's ethnic makeup and geographic location. In the center of Yugoslavia, bordered by both Croatia and Serbia, and composed of a population that was 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian and 17 percent Croatian, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a prime candidate for violent dismemberment once the federal status quo collapsed. The EU's decision in favor of self-determination posed a particular problem for the Muslim (and largely urban) plurality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which stood to lose the most from the collapse of their republic. And because of this, the EU bears a special moral responsibility for what has transpired since that time.
The European Union has taken only one substantive decision since the Yugoslavian crisis began, and it was the wrong decision. Support for republican self-determination, without a firm commitment by the EU to protect minorities and punish acts of aggression against newly constituted nation-states, was an irresponsible act.Virtually all of the EU's policies since that time have been designed to make the subsequent catastrophe as painless as possible for the victims and as costly as possible for the aggressors, within the very strict limits imposed by the West European commitment to a "civilian power" role. In practical terms, this has meant an ambitious humanitarian effort in support of besieged civilians and economic and political sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, which have been identified as the principal villains in the Yugoslavian crisis.
71 EU apologists have tended to depict this story as a tragedy--by definition an unfortunate but unavoidable event. But Michael Brenner is closer to the truth:
It was not preordained that EC countries be so shortsighted about the dangers of Yugoslavia's dismantlement and the ethnic passions it liberated; nor that they act fitfully and, too often, too late in trying to bring their influence to bear; nor that they cast the die for Bosnia through the illconsidered, premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; nor that they respond to the Bosnia catastrophe with hollow threats whose unfulfillment gave courage to the intransigent; . . . nor that their stern demands for the closing of detention camps and cessation of the shelling of cities be left as paper declarations while the Twelve exhausted their time and energy on the Maastricht ratification crisis. 72 To the extent that the international community can take any reassurance for the situation in Bosnia it comes from the fact that the Serbs and Croats have accomplished most of what they had hoped for and that some form of diplomatic agreement is likely in the near future, based upon a military fait accompli. Whether this diplomatic agreement actually protects the rump Bosnian Muslim community remains to be seen. It is entirely possible, however, that the artificial enclaves carved out for the Bosnian Muslims will not protect them for long. In which case, the world will have achieved a "solution" of sorts to the Bosnian crisis. It will be a solution of the type discussed by Russian historian Frederick Starr during a recent speech at Dickinson College. When asked to comment on the prospects for the ethnic minorities in the former USSR, Starr observed that from the view of an historian the situation of minorities was pretty straightforward. One looked at a particular minority problem at one point, and then, when one returned to this situation at some later point, the problem was no longer there.
Conclusion: From Exclusive European Union<R>To Inclusive Transatlantic Community.
In a recent report for the North Atlantic Assembly, Thijs van Vlijmen observed:
. . . even if all can agree that future historians will rub their eyes in disbelief when they come to examine how civilized Europe could allow such atrocities to be perpetrated (in former Yugoslavia) for so long on this continent, we must also acknowledge that there are powerful political realities at work here which militate against effective action to stop the carnage.
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But Western European governments created many of these "political realities" by their quest for an artificially safe and affluent European Union. These governments were constrained in their handling of the Yugoslavian crisis by "powerful" forces of self-delusion and irresponsibility. At a minimum, any new approach to pan-European order must be built upon a more realistic appreciation by EU governments of their responsibility for regional security and a more collaborative relationship with Washington. Stanley Sloan has described this relationship as "a new transatlantic bargain" in defense of pan-European order. 74 The measure of any such bargain must be some standard of efficacy, that is, the degree to which nations responsible for preserving order are capable of agreeing on the need for action and are then capable of achieving whatever policy they commit themselves to.
The first step in establishing a new transatlantic bargain is for the nations on both sides of the now-defunct Berlin Wall to accept the current and future indispensability of NATO as the cornerstone of pan-European security. As a practical matter, this question no longer seems to be in dispute. Even France, which has been in the forefront of the campaign to establish a distinct European defense identity as an alternative to NATO, has quietly adjusted its position as a result of the harrowing experiences associated with the collapse of Yugoslavia. Dominique Moisi of the French Institute for International Relations put the matter bluntly in a recent interview with The New York Times:
I'd say we are looking for impetus and reassurance from the United States. Impetus because we realized sadly that, without the United States to kick us, we don't move. Reassurance because Europe is again becoming a dangerous place. And we don't feel at ease alone with ourselves. 75 The widespread acceptance of NATO's indispensability for pan-European security is illustrated by the cordial and collaborative atmosphere which surrounded the January 1994 Alliance summit in Brussels. According to the opening statement of the summit:
NATO has moved to the center stage again. Gone is the headline "Why NATO." . . . NATO owes its attractiveness to the security which it alone can guarantee to its member nations. . . . But this is not the only reason. . . . It is the key element of stability in a world more and more shaken by instability, crises and conflicts. No new security order in Europe is conceivable without it.
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The Alliance summit contributed to the process of Franco-American reconciliation on the future of European security. It also consolidated and expanded upon some of the very positive changes which have been underway within NATO since 1990. Three changes deserve brief mention.
First, NATO has been adjusting its strategy to the demands of the post-cold war situation. NATO governments established the guidelines for the new allied strategy during the London Conference of July 1990 and formalized them as the Alliance's "New Strategic Concept" (NSC) at the Rome Conference of November 1991. The NSC commits NATO to scrap the relatively static and heavy concentration of forces around the Central Region which characterized the cold war, in favor of a more complex and multidirectional defense posture which places a premium on flexibility and mobility. In accordance with this new defense posture, NATO is developing both Immediate Reaction Forces (capable of full deployment in 2 to 10 days) and more substantial Rapid Reaction Forces (fully deployable in 10 to 30 days). These forces will be backed by NATO's Main Defence Forces, which will constitute 65 percent of the total force. A headquarters has already been established for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and the Corps itself should become operational in 1995. 77 The Alliance has also accorded a high priority to the development of multinational units, and arrangements have been worked out for the subordination of the Franco-German "Eurocorps" to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in times of crisis.
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Building upon these initiatives, the participants in the recent NATO summit agreed to begin work on the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to respond to future contingencies. NATO governments have introduced the formula of "separable but not separate" forces to describe the CJTF concept. 79 As currently envisioned, CJTF units will be capable of ad hoc and flexible configuration in response to European crises. U.S. forces may or may not be part of CJTF operations, or American units may be used solely for logistical, intelligence or air support roles. One of the purposes of the CJTF concept is to make it easier to conceive of circumstances under which the WEU could take on an operational role, with NATO's backing and support. Plans also allow for the participation of East and Central European troops in CJTF operations.
The second and related area of ongoing NATO reform involves new procedures to facilitate political cooperation with other security-related institutions. NATO's evolving relationship with the WEU illustrates this latter trend. Cooperation between these two institutions has been hard to achieve over the last 3 years, but progress has been made by both sides. 80 This has made it easier for European governments to pursue a common defense identity without doing violence to the missions or purposes of NATO. The recent move of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels was of more than symbolic value in this regard.
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NATO has also adjusted to the new circumstances of the post-cold war era by establishing guidelines for cooperation with the United Nations and the CSCE in support of pan-European peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations. 82 At the time that the Berlin Wall came down, many commentators expressed the hope that the U.N. and the CSCE would be able to work with the EC to resolve Europe's future security problems by recourse to "civilian power" alone. Before long, however, representatives of these larger institutions had come to realize that NATO, with its unique combination of political and military resources, was still necessary for the preservation of order on the Continent. NATO governments have responded positively, and are currently working with both the U.N. and the CSCE to clarify issues of command and to establish procedures for notification and consultation.
The third, and arguably the most important, change that NATO has undergone since the collapse of the Berlin Wall is its outreach to the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. In an editorial which was published in 1990, American historian John Lewis Gaddis recommended that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be preserved in post-cold war Europe, and that the two alliances should be merged into a pan-European security organization. 83 This was a fundamentally bad idea. It nonetheless reflected a very valid concern about the dangers that the international community would face if the nations of the former Soviet Bloc were left without any institutionalized fora for security cooperation and mutual reassurance.
NATO's initial response to this problem was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. The purpose of NACC is to enhance stability throughout the European region by providing the nations of the former Warsaw Pact with a forum for dialogue, consultation and the development of joint projects. In the relatively short time since its first meeting the organization has grown in membership (38 countries), in geographic scope ("from Vancouver to Vladivostok" including the Central Asian nations which were formerly part of the Soviet Union), and in responsibilities. The NACC has become a venue for pan-European discussions relating to arms control, defense cooperation, crisis management and peacekeeping. Meetings between foreign and defense ministers of the NACC governments have helped to maintain the momentum for approval and compliance with the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and other arms control agreements. They have also provided an indispensable forum for consultation and policy coordination relating to ongoing crises in the former Yugoslavia and in portions of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, NACC has followed NATO's lead by making itself available to the U.N. and the CSCE for pan-European peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement activities.
As of this writing, however, the NACC is still an under-utilized institution with a very marginal political status. This will probably change as a result of the "Partnership for Peace" program which was the centerpiece of the recent NATO summit in Brussels. This program elevates East-West security cooperation to the level of a top priority for the NATO Alliance, and insures that international attention will continue to be focused on this issue. The Partnership is essentially an open invitation to the 22 nations of the NACC which are not already members of NATO, and to any other European nations "on which the NATO allies agree" to participate in a "framework for detailed, operational military cooperation for multinational security efforts that has NATO at its core." Among the military activities that Partnership nations are invited to participate in are joint military planning, training and exercises. According to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, "They could even include operations such as search and rescue missions, disaster relief, peacekeeping and crisis management." According to the terms of the recent NATO Summit communique, Partnership nations will be invited to send permanent representatives to both NATO Headquarters and to a newly created Partnership Coordinating Cell at SACEUR Headquarters in Mons, Belgium. 84 This would give Partnership representatives an opportunity to participate on a day-to-day basis in both political discussions and military planning activities.
At the core of the new Partnership arrangement is a NATO offer of security consultation "whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of a partner state is threatened." 85 Students of NATO politics will be quick to recognize these words as Article 4 of the NATO treaty. Students of NATO politics will also be quick to note that Article 4 is a much weaker commitment than Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which commits all signatories to treat ". . .an attack on one or more of the Parties. . .(as) an attack against them all. . ." NATO governments have been clear in their message to the nations which are candidates for Partnership--this is neither an iron-clad security guarantee nor a promise of eventual NATO membership. While it is true that some East and Central European governments would have preferred direct membership in NATO to affiliation through the NACC and the new Partnership arrangement, no one who monitors recent developments can fail to be impressed with the progress that NATO has made in institutionalizing pan-European security cooperation in such a brief period of time.
In all likelihood, the status and influence of the NACC will be significantly increased over the next couple of years, since it is the appropriate forum for transforming the East-West Partnership into an operational reality. NACC's institutional assets will also have to be improved. William Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young are among the experts who have recommended steps to make NACC "more substance-oriented."
86 Institutionalized procedures for NACC consultation and policy coordination need to be enhanced. 87 One possible improvement would be for the creation of a new Deputy Secretary-General position responsible for coordinating NACC affairs. There is also a need for more staffing within the NATO Secretariat but dedicated to NACC, to facilitate planning, conflict monitoring and consultation within the NACC framework.
Hopefully, progress in the institutionalization of NACC will help to alleviate the concerns of those nations of the former Warsaw Pact that are pressing for full NATO membership. 88 This does not mean that NATO governments should use NACC permanently to foreclose the option of NATO membership for the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. But much more can be done to make NACC a respected and effective entity in its own right while the more difficult issue of expanding NATO membership is sorted out among the current 16 Alliance members.
Another important step which should be taken in the very near future to reassure the nations of the former Warsaw Pact and bolster the security of the post-cold war order in Europe is the convening of a pan-European summit for the purpose of signing a "European Stability Pact." Many experts have argued that Europe does not need a major international conference along the lines of Vienna and Versailles to codify the results of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Professor Kalevi Holsti, for example, has argued that the pervasiveness of liberal values among the key actors in the new European system obviates the need for a pan-European treaty. 89 But the events which have taken place in Europe since 1992 give us reason to be more pessimistic. As discussed earlier in this monograph, the form of liberalism which has developed in Western Europe has both positive and negative elements. The well-known positive elements include behavioral predispositions to rationalism and moderation as well as concern for human rights and democracy. The less-appreciated negative elements include parochialism, self-delusion and ambivalence. Under these circumstances, West European liberalism per se is not a reliable guarantor of pan-European order. The positive elements of West European liberalism need to be reinforced, codified and extended eastward by the signing of a regional stability pact.
In a 1993 draft interim report entitled "Engaging the New Democracies," the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) discussed the three essential components of such a comprehensive security pact: rules regarding the inviolability of borders, treatment of minorities, and peaceful settlement of disputes. 90 French Prime Minister Edouard Baladur has argued that the EU should play the leading role in sponsoring a conference to negotiate such a treaty, and NATO governments have now endorsed the European Union's call for such a stability pact. 91 A strong and assertive role for the EU is essential for the success of such a pan-European treaty for several reasons, not the least being that the European Union can offer recalcitrant Eastern and Central European governments economic incentives--including the possibility of EU membership--to move the process forward. But this will require West European governments to confront directly some of the issues which they have been able to disregard during the debate over Maastricht. The need for such a fundamental reassessment of the EU's proper role on the Continent was articulated by Prime Minister John Major in what may be the most important public statement of his Premiership:
A powerful view--still dangerously fashionable among some continental politicians--is that the fault of Maastricht lay in not going far enough . . . I believe profoundly that this view is wrong. . . . Unless the Community is seen to be tackling the problems which affect them (the people) now, it will lose its credibility. . . . So let us have a very serious debate based, not on wishful thinking, but on the real situation in Europe and the World.
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The "real situation in Europe" requires a high-profile meeting of the heads of state from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" to recommit themselves to the rules of behavior articulated in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris (1990) relating to the status of disputed borders, procedures for international dispute resolution, and the treatment of citizens and minorities. To insure that the final document which is produced by this meeting is more than a list of platitudes, the G-7 governments and the nations of the EU and NATO should commit themselves to using the document as a point of reference for making future decisions about aid, trade, diplomatic support and institutional membership. Signatory governments should also agree to use the document as a basis for making decisions and taking actions in response to crises within and between European countries. The final document should be in the form of a treaty, to further enhance its international importance. But if the crisis in Yugoslavia has taught us anything, it is that diplomatic initiatives can be either irrelevant or actually harmful if they are not backed by useable and effective power.
For the foreseeable future the locus of such power can only be NATO. And it is somewhat ironic that the evolving NATO-based security system in Europe resembles the vision of European security articulated by George Kennan in 1948. During the Washington Preparatory Talks for the NATO treaty, Kennan floated the idea of a three-tier security system. At its core would be the five nations of the 1948 Brussels treaty (France, Britain, the Benelux States) plus the United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark. He envisioned a second ring of "associate members," comprised of certain governments (Kennan specifically mentioned Portugal and Sweden) which would be accorded security guarantees in exchange for basing privileges. A third "affiliate" category would be established for various nations and territories which the Western governments considered to be of special strategic importance.
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At present, the NATO system seems to be moving toward a different form of three-tier system with a European core comprised of the WEU/EU nexus, a second ring of states which is made up of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance and a third ring which is composed of the 38 nations of NACC. The essential difference between Kennan's vision and the evolving NATO system is that Kennan's system was based upon differentiated membership--what U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett referred to as "resident members, non-resident members and summer privileges." By contrast, in the evolving European order the Atlantic Alliance is inextricably engaged in all three circles--providing the context for the development of the WEU/EU system and the bedrock for the development of the NACC. This makes the current system much less vulnerable than Kennan's system would have been to recriminatory disputes about first, second and third class citizenship. But it does not solve the problem altogether. Indeed, the greatest challenge that NATO governments will face in the next few years will be the need to preserve a sense of cohesion and common purpose in the face of new responsibilities for European security and new opportunities for cooperation with other institutions involved in the maintenance of European order. The impressive record of intra-Alliance cooperation since the collapse of the Berlin Wall nonetheless encourages optimism about NATO's ability to find imaginative solutions to such challenges.
In the conclusion to his aforementioned editorial, John Gaddis observes that "It is a principal of enlightened conservatism that one ought to retain what history shows to have worked, even as one accommodates to the changes history is bringing." We can be grateful to Professor Gaddis for reminding us of this principle, even if he drew the wrong conclusions. Fortunately, NATO governments have not drawn the wrong conclusions. They have preserved what worked and moved quickly to make some very constructive changes.
For NATO to develop into the central pillar of pan-European security, however, key West European governments will have to reconcile themselves to the fact that the politics of EU construction have been more of a problem than a solution for Europe as a whole. They have perpetuated a cramped and selfish approach to world politics among the nations of Western Europe. It is not too late for the governments of Western Europe to break out of the psychological prison of Maastricht, however. A first step in this process of strategic reassessment is for EU governments to confront directly the question that was raised in the introduction to this study: What, in the world, is Europe for? I have argued that the correct answer is that Western Europe must play a leading role in the construction of a new transatlantic liberal union based upon support for the related values of democracy and free markets. These are the only values that can provide the industrial democracies of North America and Western Europe with a vision that will energize their respective publics and a coherent purpose for their policies in the larger pan-European and trans-Mediterranean region. And unless the members of the new liberal union are prepared to work together to advance and defend these values, neither the EU nor the Atlantic Community has a future. 23. This fact is best illustrated by the way in which the EU invests its resources and institutional energies. For example, only a handful of the 19,000 "Eurocrats" employed by the EU deal with foreign and defense affairs. Most of the progress that is being made in the realm of defense cooperation is under the auspices of the WEU which is discussed later in this report. Regarding the efforts by Jacques Delors to establish a more ambitious foreign and defense role for the EU Commission, see "Uncivil War in the European Community," The Economist, January 30, 1993, p. 49. 
